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A reporting framework for describing and a
typology for categorizing and analyzing the
designs of health care pay for performance
schemes
Yewande Kofoworola Ogundeji1* , Trevor A. Sheldon2 and Alan Maynard2ˆ
Abstract
Background: Pay for Performance (P4P) has increasingly being adopted in different countries as a provider
payment mechanism to improve health system performance. Evaluations of pay for performance (P4P) schemes
across several countries show significant variation in effectiveness, which may be explained by differences in design.
There is however no reliable framework to structure the reporting of the design or a typology to help analyse and
interpret results of P4P schemes. This paper reports the development of a reporting framework and a typology of
P4P schemes.
Methods: P4P design features were identified from literature and then explored using relevant theories from
behavioural and economic science. These design features were then combined with the help of multidimensional
tables to produce a reporting framework and a typology which was tested using 74 P4P studies. The inter-rater
reliability of the typology was assessed using Fleiss’ Kappa.
Results: A Healthcare Incentive Scheme Reporting Framework (HISReF) was developed consisting of nine design
features. This was collapsed into a typology consisting of 4 items/design features. There was good inter-rater
reliability on all the four items on the typology (kappa > 0.7).
Conclusion: The HISReF provides an important first step towards establishing a common language in which
intervention designers can clearly specify the content of P4P designs. Our typology may be used to aid evidence
synthesis and interpretation of results of P4P schemes.
Keywords: Performance for performance (P4P), Typology, Design, Heterogeneity, Behaviour, Reporting
Background
Pay for performance (P4P) in healthcare has been
adopted in many countries across to aid improvements
in health service delivery across a range of clinical areas
[1]. It is important that we learn from the experiences of
these schemes when deciding if such schemes are useful
and cost effective in promoting improved quality of and
access to care. There have been several evaluations and
reviews of evaluations of P4P schemes and these show
significant variation in effect, and it is difficult to make
sense of this evidence due to heterogeneity in design, im-
plementation, and context [2–5]. Too often, P4P schemes
do not make clear the theoretical basis and justifications
for the designs of the schemes. Similarly, evaluations do
not relate the findings to the features of the programmes
under scrutiny, even though there is a range of theory
from behavioural science and economics that can be used
to understand better how people respond to incentives.
A few researchers have considered some of the design
features of P4P to see how they relate to its effectiveness
[6–8], but these have used somewhat ad hoc approaches
and there are no studies in the literature combining de-
sign features of P4P in a standardised and reliable
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framework which can be used to explore this variation
in systematic way. To sensibly describe, evaluate, and
compare P4P schemes, there is a need for a standardised
and theoretically informed reporting framework and a
way to categorise schemes in a common typology.
This paper contributes to this area by (a) developing a
reporting tool for the design features of P4P schemes
and (b) constructing, refining and testing the reliability
of a typology which can be used to compare and analyse
P4P schemes. Developing a typology is particularly im-
portant because the design variables of P4P schemes are
not mutually exclusive and some of them work synergis-
tically with others or completely nullified by others.
Methods
We developed the reporting framework and the typology
following the ‘constructed type’ method of McKinney (1966)
[9, 10] because of the importance of applying it to empirical
cases. This method involved five major steps (the first three
of which were used to develop the reporting template):
i) Identification from the literature, of design features
potentially for inclusion in the typology
ii) Identification and exploration of behavioural
science and economics theories which may indicate
the relevance of these design features to changing
health service behaviour
iii) Combining the design features in a
multidimensional space: this involved defining
standard criteria for design features identified and
combining them in a multidimensional space. This
resulted in an original typology which we present as
a standardised template for the reporting of
characteristics of P4P schemes.
iv) Piloting the typology: The functionality of the P4P
typology was tested against a set of pre-defined
criteria [11–13]: (1) Relevance: all the core
components considered, (2) Manageability and ease
of use: not cumbersome with only a few types, (3)
Mutual exclusivity: only one type for each P4P
program, and (4) Comprehensiveness: whether all
the empirical P4P programs could be categorized.
v) Refining/reducing the typology: We reduced the
typology using three methods [11, 12]: (a)
dichotomization of variables, by merging any
variables within design features so that there are just
two categories; (b) pragmatic reduction, which
involves combining or compressing design features
with the same underlying theory or concept [13–15];
(c) rescaling, which involves the removal of less
relevant features from the typology.
Following the development and refinement of the typ-
ology, we then undertook an assessment of the reliability
of the categorisation of schemes using the P4P typology
tool by exploring the extent to which raters independ-
ently assessing the same papers describing the scheme
agreed on their classification. We used Fleiss’ Kappa to
assess the inter-rater reliability of all the items on the
typology as a P4P categorisation tool [16, 17]. This in-
volved raters/users applying the P4P typology to a sam-
ple of reports of P4P studies. We aimed for five
independent assessments for each study report. We esti-
mated the sample size for the number of reports of P4P
to be assessed based on the probability of detecting a
statistically significant kappa (the difference between the
overall and chance agreement Pa-Pe) with a confidence
interval of a desired width as suggested by Sim and
Wright [18] and Gwet [19] (see Table 1). In total, 12 vol-
unteer raters used the typology to categorise between 5
and 6 P4P reports. A kappa value of 0.9 (30% relative
error) was selected based on a trade-off between preci-
sion and a reasonable number of P4P reports to avoiding
burdening the raters. This meant the raters had to apply
the typology on a minimum of 14 P4P reports. The rater
population consisted of five PhD students, four Masters
students, and three Masters degree level health service
researchers. Four of the raters had between zero to one
year of research experience, seven raters had between
two to four years of research experience, and one rater
had over 5 years of research experience. Only three of
the raters had previous experience of P4P schemes in
healthcare. A manual was developed to train the volun-
teer raters which included clear and concise decision
rules (with examples) to accompany the guidance for ap-
plying the tool to reports of P4P schemes. Volunteer
raters were trained face to face or over skype on how to
use the typology to categorize P4P schemes. The raters
assigned their classification independently of each other
using all four items on the typology. All analysis was
done on Stata version 12.
Table 1 Number of P4P reports needed to estimate kappa
Pa − Pe Relative Error
20% 30% 40%
0.1 2500 1111 625
0.2 625 278 156
0.3 278 123 69
0.4 156 69 39
0.5 100 44 25
0.6 69 31 17
0.7 51 23 13
0.8 39 17 10
0.9 31 14 8
1.0 25 11 6
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Results
Identification of design features and theories
The design features we identified from literature include:
who receives the incentives, type of incentives, type of
payment, size of incentives, method of payment, per-
formance measure, payment mechanism, the time lag
between the measurement of performance and payment
of the incentive, the domain of performance measured
(process, structure, outcome). We then examined these
design features considering relevant theories and con-
cepts from behavioural science and economics literature
(see Additional file 1: Tables S1 to S3).
Design features and the relevant theories
Who receives the incentives?
P4P schemes involve payment of financial incentives to
one or more of: individual health professionals and
groups (clinical teams, health institutions) [20–22]. Or-
ganizations/groups are capable of setting up good man-
agement structures that could be strong enough to elicit
a change in behaviour. For example, incentives paid to
groups could be used to purchase equipment or hire
additional staff, which could lead to improvements in
quality and performance [23–27]. This argument is in line
with organisation theory which proposes that payment of
incentives to groups rather than individuals are more
likely to have desired effects because organisations are
capable of promoting behaviour change in employees
through a wide range of strategies e.g. better structures,
improved supervision, enacting stricter guidelines and pol-
icies [28]. Although, this is dependent on the quality of
managerial or organisational effectiveness and control.
The argument for paying directly to individual health
care professionals as opposed to groups or institutions is
informed by the ‘free rider’ problem [29–32]. This sug-
gests that individuals are more likely to undersupply the
service being incentivised when they share responsibility
of providing that service because they might feel that the
payment might be shared equally rather than based on
individual contributions. Therefore, there is less incen-
tive to try to perform better because as an individual,
one can ‘get away with’ not changing behaviour and still
receive the incentive. Furthermore, some researchers
suggest that paying individual health professionals could
create competition among the individual providers, so
producing adverse consequences such as hoarding of
knowledge and skills, thereby undermining the promo-
tion of team based care, which is believed to be import-
ant to improving the quality of care [29].
Form of incentive: fines or bonuses (loss aversion theory)
There are two forms of financial incentive used in P4P
schemes: fines and bonuses. Kahneman and Tversky de-
veloped The Loss Aversion Theory, which explains the
tendency for people to prefer to avoid losses compared
to acquiring gains. Adam Smith wrote, “Pain... is in al-
most all cases a more pungent sensation than the oppos-
ite and correspondent pleasure. The one almost always
depresses us much more below the ordinary or what
might be called the natural state of our happiness, than
the other ever raises us above it” (Smith, quoted in May-
nard, 2012, p.8) [33]. From this perspective, fines are
more likely to motivate behavioural change than bo-
nuses. In addition, P4P schemes, which use fines, might
be more sustainable compared to P4P programmes that
only use bonuses because they could be less costly [34].
The implication of this in P4P in health care is that prac-
titioners will be more inclined to change behaviour or
increase performance if they think they might lose some-
thing rather than get a bonus. However, bonuses are still
the most common form of incentives used in P4P pro-
grammes in healthcare or a combination of bonuses and
fines. This may be because fines can lead to a loss of in-
trinsic motivation, aggravating clinicians who have altru-
istic purposes and who might feel they are not being
appreciated for their work [35–37] Fines are also harder
to administer and to handle from an accounting per-
spective, particularly in weaker health systems [38].
Type of incentive: monetary or non-monetary (justifiability,
evaluability, and expectancy theories)
Evaluability theory suggests that some non-monetary in-
centives are more difficult to value monetarily and may be
more desirable as a result. For example, an award in rec-
ognition of performance that provides an all-expenses
paid holiday to an exotic island is likely to be considered a
pleasurable experience. These positive attributes are diffi-
cult to ‘put a price on’ and thus may be ascribed a higher
value than the cash equivalent. Behaviour change then be-
comes an effective way of acquiring something that some-
one could not normally justify purchasing with their own
money [39, 40]. Crifo and Diaye found that if agents are
continually rewarded with money there is the possibility
of reward inflation i.e. the agents get used to the incen-
tives and so might no longer be as motivated by it to
change behaviour [41]. Despite this, non-monetary incen-
tives are rarely used in P4P schemes.
A contrary view would be supported by expectancy the-
ory [42], which suggests that: “individuals act to maximize
expected satisfaction with outcomes”. The theory assumes
that individuals’ motivation to work is dependent on two
factors: (1) the expectancy about the relationship between
effort and a particular outcome and (2) the valence (at-
tractiveness) of the outcome. These two factors are be-
lieved to create the motivation that will lead to individuals
changing their behaviour towards achieving the desired
outcome. Vroom argued that money has valence because it
is effective in acquiring things desired by individuals such
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as material goods of their choice [42]. Therefore, money
might be more effective in driving behavioural change
compared to non-monetary incentives. This might be par-
ticularly true for individuals whose salaries are barely suffi-
cient. In such cases, money might be a more effective
driver of behaviour change than non-monetary incentives.
Since people can choose how to use monetary incentives,
this might be more effective than non-monetary incentives
that might be of value to some agents within the same P4P
scheme [43]. Furnham and Argyle further argue that
money has symbolic value due to its perceived relationship
to prestige, status, and other factors [43]. Monetary incen-
tives may have higher valence than non-monetary incen-
tives, depending on the relative payment schedules.
Size of incentives (the target income hypothesis)
The most common form of description of size of incen-
tive is the amount of money relative to the clinicians’
salary, usual budget of the health institution, or antici-
pated payment regarding the health service(s) in ques-
tion. Other P4P programs simply report the size of
incentive in absolute terms as the actual amount earned.
Hahn suggested that the effect of an incentive might be
influenced by its size compared to the usual salary, budget,
or anticipated payment [44]. Incentives might be too small
compared to the usual salary, to induce significant change
even when the objectives are measured accurately and fairly
evaluated. As the size of the incentives (fines or bonuses)
increase, everything else being equal, people may be moti-
vated to work harder to reach the set targets. Though the
relationship is likely to demonstrate diminishing marginal
returns; after a certain point, increasing the size of incentive
might not bring about the required behaviour change, lead-
ing to a waste of resources [45]. So, attaching too large an
incentive might result in paying more than necessary to
bring about the desired behavioural change. The size of in-
centive also raises the question of cost-effectiveness of P4P
schemes, as money spent on the incentive might not be jus-
tified by the potential benefits in patient outcomes resulting
from behaviour change.
When assessing the size of an incentive in a report of a
P4P scheme, therefore, it is best to calculate its value rela-
tive to the clinicians’ usual salary/reimbursement. There
are no set cut-offs in theory as to what size of incentive is
adequate to change behaviour, so we suggest arbitrary
cut-offs guided by some empirical evidence. The size of
incentives in P4P schemes in healthcare tend to range
from 0.5% to up to 100% increase in individual salary or
institution budget. Studies indicate that most P4P initia-
tives with less than 5% increase/decrease in payment had
no statistically significant effect on the performance indi-
cator compared to P4P schemes with above 5% in salary
or budget [34, 46–48]. For the purpose of developing the
P4P typology, we proposed 3 categories of size of incentive
(relative to usual reimbursement) namely: small (< 5%),
medium (5–10%), and large (> 10%).
There is some evidence that “physicians have a desired
income that they want to achieve whenever their actual
income is below that income” [49]. This is commonly re-
ferred to as the Target Income Hypothesis and if valid, it
means that increasing the size of incentive would result
in an increase in performance only until the clinicians
reach their target income after which, increasing the size
of incentive may not increase it any further and indeed
may reduce performance. Desquins and colleagues [50]
found that 80% of physicians would be willing to per-
form better to reach a target income, a finding sup-
ported by other researchers [51, 52]. Those developing
P4P schemes, therefore, should have an idea of the aver-
age target income of the clinicians participating in the
P4P programmes, for example through surveys [53]. In
reality clinicians may use some of the additional revenue
not as personal income but to enhance facilities [27]. In
addition to the effect of the size of incentive relating to
income and target income, its impact is also likely to be
influenced by the difficulty of reaching the performance
or targets that is required to receive the payment. This
could mean that what constitutes an adequate incentive
to improve performance or reach a certain target in a
certain area of healthcare is likely to differ across con-
texts (such as high and low income countries).
Method of payment (coupled or decoupled from usual
reimbursement): mental accounting theory
The method of payment in incentive programmes can be
coupled or decoupled from salary or income. For example,
increasing the usual salary of £2000 to £2080, compared
to making a separate payment of £80. Mental Accounting
Theory states that individuals divide their current and fu-
ture assets into separate, non-transferable portions and
will assign different levels of utility of each asset in each
group [54]. This predicts that people will value incentives
more highly if not coupled with the usual salary [39]. Ap-
plying this theory to P4P schemes means that it is likely
that individuals would place more value on incentives not
coupled with the usual salary compared to incentives
coupled with salary (even though they might be the same
amount). Decoupling the incentives from usual reim-
bursement might be administratively more burdensome.
It could however be worth the additional cost, if it con-
tributes to the success of the P4P programmes.
Payment mechanism (absolute or tiered thresholds): the
goal gradient theory
There are two main kinds of payment mechanisms in P4P
schemes. The first involves a payment for achieving a fixed
absolute target (e.g. 70% of people having their blood pres-
sure measured) and the second involves variable and
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increasing payments triggered at various tiered targets
(e.g. 60, 70, and 80%) or a continuous scale.
Goal Gradient Theory [55] predicts a greater positive
behavioural response if there are a series of stepped tar-
get thresholds [36]. Therefore an incentive payment
made for reaching an absolute threshold or a single tar-
get might be less effective in changing behaviour com-
pared to one which increases as performance further
improves, because individuals in an incentive programme
intensify their efforts as they sense that they are getting
closer to their target goal [56].
There is also the risk of loss of interest or motivation
when the target goal is achieved (this might explain why
some successful P4P programmes seem to reach a plat-
eau or even dip after sometime) where there is just one
target [57]. This suggests that having tiered targets or a
sliding scale might challenge the clinicians to a contin-
ued effort in improving performance. Individuals are
more likely to be motivated when the target goals appear
to be ‘realistic’. Tiered targets might also be more effect-
ive if the final target goal is far from the baseline as it
might be viewed as unachievable to the individuals,
who may see no reason to try to meet the target, as
they are likely to fail. In addition to the risk of not
getting any payment, this might also reflect the per-
ceived cost to them of achieving it; the expected
benefit might be too low.
Performance measure, domain of performance, and time
lag: risk aversion theory
Risk Aversion Theory tries to explain the behaviour of
individuals when exposed to risk or uncertainty. An in-
dividual is less likely to change behaviour or do more
work the higher the risk of not getting the expected re-
ward, instead they are more likely to focus on activities
where the reward is more certain [58]. In P4P schemes
in healthcare, there are several elements of risk or uncer-
tainty of not getting paid the anticipated or desired
amount, which could reduce the impact of the scheme.
The riskiness of a scheme may be explained in terms
of the following P4P design features:
a. The degree to which the target takes into account
achievement in absolute terms or relative to how
others perform (performance measure: absolute or
relative measure)
b. The degree to which the person/organisation being
incentivised can directly control or influence the
performance being measured (domain of
performance measured)
c. The confidence the provider has of being paid if
they do improve performance/achieve the
relevant target.
Performance measure (absolute and relative measures)
Absolute measure of performance is when an incentive
is paid for a level of quality improvement, independent
of other providers’ performance (e.g. payment per pa-
tient immunized). A relative measure, on the other hand,
is when incentive is paid for attaining above a specified
rank relative to other providers (e.g. payment to clini-
cians for exceeding the median or bottom quartile im-
munisation rate). Relative performance measures create
greater uncertainty for health service providers because
their achievement depends also on how well others do.
Providers may be less motivated to invest in improving
performance if they have doubts about their perform-
ance relative to others. P4P schemes where absolute per-
formance measures are used are, therefore, more likely
to be more effective.
Domain of performance (to what extent is it within the
control of the provider)
The domain of performance measured may be related to
the degree of control the provider has on achieving per-
formance improvement expectations and so the level of
perceived risk of not being rewarded. The domains of
performance that could be measured include:
 Structure: this involves the resources to deliver care
e.g. equipment, IT, human resources, facilities, and
materials)
 Process: involves performing routine operations,
specific tasks or recommended treatments e.g.
periodic cholesterol screening, immunization.
 Intermediate outcomes: Intermediate outcomes are
the steps or outcomes between the change in
behaviour and the final health outcome
(e.g. reduction in cholesterol levels, reduction in
blood pressure). If evidence-based, there is likely to
be a causal link between achieving the intermediate
outcome and improvement in final outcomes
(e.g. reduction in heart disease). However, this is not
guaranteed as other factors may intervene.
 Final outcomes: these are effects on the quality and
length of life and wellbeing of people (e.g. reduction
in mortality and morbidity rates).
Changes in structure and process (and to a lesser ex-
tent intermediate outcome) domains of performance are
often seen as more easily achievable because they are
more directly under the control of the healthcare
organization or clinician, compared with the final (or
intermediate) health outcome measures which are influ-
enced by a variety of other factors. Underachievement of
final health outcome targets does not always mean there
is a quality problem [59]. For example, if a clinician is to
be incentivised based on a reduction in cardiovascular
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mortality rates, the positive efforts by the clinician may
be thwarted by lifestyle choices of the patients (e.g. exer-
cise, diet), adherence to treatment and other (e.g. envir-
onmental) factors outside their direct control.
For this reason, P4P interventions that focus on the
final health outcome domain of performance might be
perceived as higher risk (greater uncertainty in earning
the incentive payment despite the efforts of the provider)
and so might not be as effective in prompting provider
behaviour change as incentives linked to changes in
structure and process domains of performance. However
the schemes might be less effective and cost-effective be-
cause structure and process changes do not necessarily
translate into improved health [60].
Timing of payment (and frequency of payment)
Timing of incentive payment ranges from monthly to
annually. When the time lag between the measurement
of performance and payment of incentives is longer it
can create some uncertainty, particularly in countries
with a track record of or poor administrative infrastruc-
ture, corruption and political instability. This uncertainty
in payment might reduce the motivation to improve per-
formance. In addition, shorter time lags between pay-
ments may indicate smaller more frequent payments,
which are more likely to motivate a higher behavioural
response in an individual compared to a one-time lump
sum incentive [61]. A randomised controlled trial con-
ducted in the USA compared annual payments to quar-
terly payments of incentives to individual physicians
worth $5000 overall for quality improvements in treat-
ments and outcomes of diabetes, cancer screening, and
smoking [62]. It found that quarterly performance group
performed better but this was because in this arm, they
had to present reports every quarter to be approved for
the payment of the incentive, which might have contrib-
uted to motivating the physicians in this group com-
pared to submitting yearly reports.
Furthermore, individuals often exhibit time preference
(or time discounting) where “happiness now is worth
more to me than happiness next year” [63]. Conse-
quently, individuals perceive incentives received soon
after the behavioural change as having more value than
the same amount received in the future, (pure time pref-
erence). Loewenstein and Prelec [64] also suggest that
time lag between measurement of performance and the
receipt of the incentives could affect behavioural re-
sponse. Individuals tend to ask themselves; is there any-
thing that I could do now that will bring me immediate
rewards instead of what I could do now that would re-
ward me in a years’ time? Consequently, P4P designs
with short time lags between provision of care and re-
ceipt of incentive might be expected to produce greater
behavioural response.
Some P4P schemes may take months or even a year or
more to collect and validate performance data. People
might be relatively motivated to change their behaviour
even if the payment is a year away (after measurements
of performance) for very large incentives, which implies
that these design features might interact with each other
to influence the impact of the scheme. This is another
advantage of developing a typology, as each type (cat-
egory) will be a unique combination of the dimensions
of the design features of P4P.
Previous studies have suggested that monthly, bi-monthly,
or quarterly payments constitute shorter time lags, while
payments after 4 months constitute a long time lag [6, 7, 65,
66]. For the purpose of categorisation in this typology,
monthly to quarterly payments were considered as short
time lags, whereas, payments made after 4 months were
considered long time lags.
Reliability of measurement of performance
Similar to the timing of payment, the reliability of meas-
urement of performance could also affect the confidence
that the health service provider has in being paid if they
do achieve the relevant target. Clinicians are likely to
perceive the potential of earning the incentive as more
uncertain if the tool for measuring performance is not
reliable. Providers will most likely not make great efforts
to change their behaviour if they might think that the
measurement tool might not accurately reflect the con-
sequent improvement in performance. It is difficult to
judge reliability from reports of schemes as it depends
partly on the perceptions of the providers in the particu-
lar context, which are not commonly reported in P4P
evaluations. This should be explored as part of the im-
plementation context when designing a scheme.
A standardised template for the reporting of
characteristics of P4P schemes
Table 2 below lays out the nine key design features of
P4P schemes that we have found from the theoretical
and empirical literature as likely to affect the impact of
the scheme on changing provider behaviour. When con-
sidered together, they constitute a reporting framework
or template – the Healthcare Incentives Reporting
Framework (HISReF). In order to increase the transpar-
ency and consistency of reporting of P4P schemes and
their evaluations, we recommend that authors provide
information on each of these nine features, over and
above other details.
Combining the design features in a multidimensional
space: development of the typology
In order to produce a typology, these features need to be
combined in a multidimensional space and doing this with
the number of design features identified would result in
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108 possible types, too many to be useful as an analytical
tool. So we reduced these to a smaller number that would
be usable, but still sufficiently informative to work as ana-
lytical tool.
Reducing the typology
Each of the nine design features identified in Table 2
had two categories apart from ‘size of incentive’ with 3
categories: small, medium, and large. We dichotomized
this further by merging the medium and large categories,
because theory suggests that medium and large incen-
tives are more likely to have similar effects compared to
small and medium incentives. This reduced the typology
to around 81 unique types/cells.
This was followed with a pragmatic reduction that in-
volved merging design features with the same underlying
theory. Three design features shared Risk Aversion theory:
timing of payment, domain of performance measured, and
performance measure. These were collapsed into one con-
ceptual variable called the ‘Perceived Risk of not earning
the incentive’ (Risk), with two categories: low risk and
high risk. In the ‘low risk’ category, clinicians perceive the
incentivised entity as a performance target that is achiev-
able and there is little or no risk of not getting paid the in-
centives. In the ‘high risk’ category, there is no guarantee
Table 2 Healthcare Incentives Reporting Framework (HISReF) - a template for reporting standard features of P4P schemes
Core design features Variables Description
Who receives the incentives? Individuals Incentive is paid to an individual health care provider e.g. physician
Groups Incentive is paid to a group and individual clinicians might not
benefit from the incentive directly e.g. hospital trust, clinical team,
general physician (GP) practice, NGO, levels of government, faith
based organizations
Type of incentive Bonuses Incentive is in the form of increase in payments, bonus, gifts, peer
recognition etc.
Fines Negative incentives in the form of reduction in expected payments,
penalty, punishment etc.
Type of payment Monetary Incentive in form of money
Non-Monetary Incentives in the form of material things or tangible gifts
Size of incentive Large Monetary or non-monetary reward or fine- > 10% of salary, budget,
or anticipated payment
Medium Monetary or non-monetary reward or fine 5–10% of salary, budget,
or anticipated payment
Small Monetary or non-monetary reward or fine < 5% of salary, budget,
or anticipated payment
Payment mechanism Absolute Incentives are paid as a single payment for an absolute increase in
performance for example, an 80% increase in performance.
Tiered thresholds Incentives are paid for a series of target thresholds to meet for
example paying increasing incentives for achieving a 65%, an
80%, and a 90% performance threshold.
Method of payment Coupled Incentives paid are coupled with usual reimbursement e.g. an
incentive in form of an increase in salary.
Decoupled Incentives are paid separately from the usual reimbursement.
Performance measure/payment scale Absolute measure Incentive is paid for improvement in performance or behaviour
change not dependent on other providers e.g. incentive paid
per patient immunized
Relative measure Incentive is paid for attaining a level of performance relative to
other providers e.g. incentives paid to clinicians or hospitals
above the median performance
Domain of performance measured Within clinicians control Incentive payments are based on process and structural outcomes
e.g. having the right equipment, the number of children immunized,
routine measurement of blood pressure of patients every month
Out of clinicians control Payment of incentives to health providers for ultimate health
outcomes e.g. reduction in mortality rates from a specific disease
Time lag Short Payment of incentives four months or less after measurement
of performance
Long Payment of incentives more than four months after measurement
of performance
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of payment because the relative performance depends on
that of others, which introduces an element of risk [58].
Table 3 shows the new conceptual (collapsed) dichotomous
variable, ‘perceived risk of not earning the incentive’ (Risk):
low risk and high risk. Individuals who perceive the risk or
uncertainty associated with earning the incentive as low
are more likely to change behaviour because there is a
higher guarantee about earning the incentive compared to
when individuals perceive the risk associated with earning
the incentive as high.
To ensure that the typology is mutually exclusive (no
P4P schemes falls into more than one type) and to ensure
that as many P4P schemes as possible can be categorized
(despite poor reporting of features in some studies), we set
a decision rule that: a P4P scheme is categorized as low
risk if it has two or more of: short time lag, domain of per-
formance within clinicians’ control, and absolute perform-
ance measure. A P4P scheme is categorized as high risk if
it has two or more of: long time lag, domain of perform-
ance out of clinicians’ control, and relative performance
measure. So whilst these features should be reported sep-
arately in the HISReF, they were collapsed into one for the
typology. This pragmatic reduction method resulted in 49
types; but this was still too many to be useful in analysis.
Finally, we rescaled the typology by removing the three
least relevant or useful design features [11, 12], as judged
by their degree of variability within the empirical P4P cases
in literature. They were: kind of incentive (monetary and
non-monetary) because in reported P4P schemes the main
form of incentive used was money; method of payment
(coupled and decoupled) as payment is mainly decoupled
from usual payments; and mechanism of payment (abso-
lute and tiered threshold), (monetary incentive) as the
mechanism of payment for a majority of the schemes was
absolute. These features are still important in the designing
and reporting P4P schemes, however, for the purpose of
the development of the typology, these features would not
contribute significantly to the analytical and theory-testing
functions of the typology. This reduction resulted in a final
typology of four design features, each consisting of two cat-
egories and a more manageable typology of 16 possible
types (Table 4):
 Who to incentivise (individuals or groups)
 Type of incentive (fines or bonuses)
 Size of incentives (small or large)
 Perceived Risk/uncertainty of payment (low risk or
high risk)
Piloting the typology
The relevance had already been demonstrated through the
process of developing the typology, which involved thor-
ough consideration of relevant theories and literature ap-
plicable to design variables of P4P. Similarly, manageability
was achieved through reduction of the typology to a few
types to facilitate its use in analyses. Schemes with a com-
bination of bonuses and fines were categorised alongside
those with only fines. This follows the rationale that indi-
viduals are still likely to manifest ‘loss aversion’ as long as
there is an element of fine or penalty and whether there is
the potential to earn bonuses or not is not likely to deter
the risk averse behaviour [35]. We also redefined the cri-
teria for categorization of payment of incentives to groups
to include instances where individuals may or may not
benefit from the group payments. This is because when in-
centives are paid to groups as opposed to individual clini-
cians, one of the ways a management system could
motivate behaviour change within the organisation is to
provide individuals an opportunity to earn from the incen-
tives received by the group. Where schemes had a mixture
of process and outcome measures we categorised them
according to the predominant measures. For example, P4P
Table 3 Collapsed variables to form a conceptual variable ‘Risk’
(Risk) Collapsed variables Categories of new variable
Low risk High risk
Performance measure Absolute: incentive is paid for
quality improvement not
dependent on other providers
e.g. incentive paid per patient
immunized
Relative: incentive is paid for attaining a
specific rank relative to other providers
e.g. incentives paid to clinicians or
hospitals in top 2 performing quartiles
Domain of performance measured Within clinicians control: incentive
payments are based on process
and structural outcomes e.g.
number of children immunized,
routine measurement of blood
pressure of patients every month
Not within clinicians control: payment of
incentives to health providers for health
outcomes e.g. reduction in blood pressure
of patients or reduction in mortality
rates from a specific disease
Time lag Short time lag: Payment of
incentives immediately after
measurement of performance)
or four months or less.
Long time lag: Payment of incentives
more than 4 months after
measurement of performance
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schemes with four outcome measures and 20 process
measures were categorized as mostly under the clinicians’
control, since there are more processes than outcomes, as
opposed to ten outcome measures and two process mea-
sures, which will be categorised as mostly out of the clini-
cians’ control. In addition, in the unlikely case where there
are equal number of processes and outcomes, the outcome
measures are likely to outweigh the process measures. The
resulting final version of the typology is shown in Table 5.
This typology was then applied again to all descrip-
tions of P4P schemes from evaluated studies identified
from reviews shown earlier in Additional file 1: Table S2.
In total, we applied the typology to characterise 73 P4P
schemes into mutually exclusive categories using the de-
sign features (see Additional file 1: Table S4). Table 6
below shows results of application of the typology on a
set of P4P schemes identified from the review by Eijke-
naar [14] (results of application of the typology on other
P4P schemes identified from other reviews are shown in
Additional file 1: Table S4). Whilst we were able to
categorize the P4P schemes using all items of the typ-
ology, the size of incentive was the most difficult to cat-
egorise because studies often used vague terms such as
‘modest’ or ‘small’, without providing absolute amounts
or sizes relative to the usual clinician income or hospital
budget. However, we were still able to categorize 46
schemes: 32 schemes had large incentive sizes and 14
schemes had small incentive sizes, which to a certain ex-
tent suggest that there was a good distribution between
the size of incentives across the programs, demonstrat-
ing the usefulness and exhaustiveness of the typology.
Inter-rater reliability (kappa) of each item on the P4P
typology
Kappa estimates for each of the four items on the
typology are shown in Table 7. Kappa values for who
receives the incentive and type of incentive were high at
> 0.9. Kappa for size of the incentive and perceived risk
of not earning the incentive were lower at 0.72 and 0.71
respectively, though still considered good inter-rater
agreement [16, 67]. Sources of disagreements between
the raters were random and not specific to any rater.
The sources of disagreement in the third and fourth
item (size of incentive and perceived risk of not earning
the incentive) reflected subjective rater judgement or lack
of clarity from study reports. Details of studies assessed,
rater characteristics and sources of disagreement between
raters are found in Additional file 1: Tables S5 to S8.
Discussion
The reporting framework (HISReF) developed in this
study was derived from the empirical and theoretical lit-
erature and consisted of nine general features likely affect
the effectiveness of a healthcare incentive scheme. From
this framework, we then developed a typology by merging
and consolidating the design features. The final typology
consists of four key design variables: who receives the
Table 4 P4P Typology
Type Who received the incentive Type of incentive Size of incentive Perceived risk of not
earning the incentive
(RISK)
1 Groups Fines Large Low
2 Groups Bonuses Large Low
3 Groups Fines Small Low
4 Groups Bonuses Small Low
5 Groups Fines Large High
6 Groups Bonuses Large High
7 Individuals Fines Large Low
8 Individuals Bonuses Large Low
9 Groups Bonuses Small High
10 Groups Fines Small High
11 Individuals Fines Small Low
12 Individuals Bonuses Small Low
13 Individuals Fines Small High
14 Individuals Bonuses Large High
15 Individuals Bonuses Small High
16 Individuals Fines Large High
Ogundeji et al. BMC Health Services Research  (2018) 18:686 Page 9 of 15
Table 5 Final version of the P4P typology
ITEM 1: Who received the incentive? Did Individuals or Groups receive the incentive?
Criteria for judging Individuals • If the incentives are paid directly to individual health workers/clinicians/doctors only
• If individual health worker/clinician/doctor’s income is supplemented as a result of
the incentive (e.g. reflected in the rise of personal income) only
Criteria for judging Groups (including schemes
where individuals and groups are paid bonuses)
If the incentive is paid to a group or an organization in which individual clinicians may
or may not benefit from the incentive directly
Groups include any of the following
• Hospital
• Clinical team
• General physician (GP) practice
• NGO
• Levels of government
• Faith based organizations
ITEM 2: Type of incentive Was the incentive in the form of Fines or Bonuses?
Criteria for judging Fines If the incentive is negative in the form of reduction in expected payments, penalty,
punishment etc. In some cases, bonuses may or may not be paid.
Criteria for judging Bonuses If incentive is in the form of increase in payments, bonus, gifts etc. with NO fines levied
ITEM 3: Size of the incentive Was the size of the incentive small or large?
Criteria for judging Small If the incentive in the P4P program is smaller than 5% of any one of the following:
• Salary of individual clinician/health worker/doctor
• Anticipated payments (to the health facility/hospital/clinical team) such as budgets
(total budget or budget for the particular intervention in question), fee for service
(FFS) and capitation
Criteria for judging Large If the incentive in the P4P program is 5% and above of any one of the following:
• Salary of individual clinician/health worker/doctor
• Anticipated payments (to the health facility/hospital/clinical team) such as budgets
(total budget or budget for the particular intervention in question), fee for service
(FFS) and capitation
ITEM 4: Perceived Risk of not earning the incentive: High risk or low risk? (based on: Timing of payment after achieving targets (time lag), Domain
of performance measure, and Performance measure (payment scale)
Criteria for judging High risk If the P4P program has 2 or more of the following features
• If incentive payment (or penalty) is made after 4 months after measurement and
confirmation of performance (long time lag)
• If the domain of performance measure was mostly out of clinicians control
• If the perofmance measure (payment scale) is a relative measure
Criteria for judging Low risk If the P4P program has 2 or more of the following features
• If incentive payment (or penalty) is made before or at 4 months after measurement
and confirmation of performance (short time lag)
• If the domain of performance measure was mostly within the clinicians’ control
• If the performance measure (payment scale) is an absolute measure
Note: It is possible to judge the risk of the program if one feature is missing/unclear.
For example, if the time lag for payment is short and the domain of performance
measure was mostly within the clinicians’ control. We can judge from this information
that the risk is low even when there is little or no information about the performance
measure
Timing of payment after achieving targets (time lag): was it short or long?
Criteria for judging short If incentive payment (or penalty) is received not more than 4 months after
measurement and confirmation of performance
Criteria for judging long If incentive payment (or penalty) is received more than 4 months after measurement
and confirmation of performance
Domain of performance measured Was the domain of performance measured within clinicians’ control or out of clinicians’ control?
Criteria for judging within clinicians control If incentive payments to health service providers are mostly/only based on processes
and structures e.g. number of children immunized, routine measurement of blood
pressure of patients every month, number of referrals made, rate of cancer screening
Criteria for judging out of clinicians control If incentive payments to health service providers depend on achieving a change in
health outcomes e.g. reduction in mortality rates from a specific disease, blood pressure
reduction, patient experience etc.
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incentives, type of incentives, size of incentives, and per-
ceived risk of not earning the incentive (a condensed vari-
able consisting three design features: performance measure,
time lag between the measurement of performance and
payment of the incentive, and the domain of performance
measured).
Limitations
There were three main limitations. There was a trade-off
between the typology being manageable and maintaining
relevance and utility. Some of the design features ex-
plored and discussed (such as method of payment and
kind of incentive) whilst included in the reporting
framework were removed from the typology and others
were collapsed. Thus the typology is not exhaustive and
so may not distinguish between schemes with sufficient
granularity. Nonetheless, this typology can provide a
foundation towards standardised categorizations of
current P4P designs in literature.
The second limitation was the problem of poor report-
ing of P4P scheme evaluations. We chose the best re-
ported studies to test the reliability of the typology and
this does not necessarily reflect the reality where most of
the P4P designs are not completely reported. Some
evaluation studies incompletely reported important de-
sign features, despite the potential association between
design features and effectiveness of the schemes. This
restricted the choice of studies given to the raters for the
inter-rater reliability test, which may have led to an
over-estimate of the reliability of the typology.
The typology, combines several theories and design fea-
tures to help describe, categorize, and analyze P4P schemes.
However, there are limitations in that the theories explored
may not necessarily be applicable to all individuals or cases.
For example, in the case of risk aversion theory, providers
will vary in their degree of risk aversion or appetite. Simi-
larly, the target income hypothesis relates primarily to phy-
sicians’ behaviour and might not necessarily be applicable
to other health professionals who are offered performance
bonuses in some contexts. In addition, the theoretical
models, by assuming at times a simple mechanism of effect
on motivation and performance, ignore that they may inter-
act to influence behaviour in complex ways.
The HISReF reporting framework includes a compre-
hensive range of nine general design features derived from
theory and empirical evidence on the likely impact of de-
sign features on the effectiveness of incentive schemes in
health care. The typology was developed from a subset of
these design features and was applied successfully to cat-
egorise a number of P4P studies into mutually exclusive
categories. It has face validity and strong content validity
in that the process of development of the typology was
transparent and decisions made were adequately justified
and relevant to empirical cases in literature. Overall, all
four items on the typology demonstrated good inter-rater
reliability; all kappa values were above 0.7. [67, 68, 69].
This implies that if the typology is adopted as a P4P cat-
egorisation tool, misclassifications of P4P schemes due to
rater error will be minimised. The inter-rater reliability of
the size of incentive K = 0.72 and perceived risk of not
earning the incentive K = 0.71were moderately lower than
the first two items (who receives the incentives and type
of incentive) because the latter were typically reported bet-
ter in the studies, and were easy to identify. This illustrates
how important it is that there is better reporting of P4P
designs in general and in evaluation studies in particular.
Table 5 Final version of the P4P typology (Continued)
Note: sometimes, incentive programs contain a mixture of processes and outcomes.
However, one category out of the two is usually predominant. For example a program
with 6 process measures and 2 outcome measures. You will have to judge what category
it falls into by deciding which category is predominant and for this example, the incentive
program falls within the clinicians control because the process measures are predominantly
more than the outcome measures.
Performance measure (payment scale) Absolute or relative measure?
Criteria for judging Absolute measure If incentive is paid (fine levied) to the health service provider that based on their performance,
not relative to how other health providers perform.
For example,
• Improvement in performance typically improvement from some baseline measure, using
performance score/ performance points achieved
• Achieving performance at/above a predetermined target
• e.g. incentive paid per patient immunized, or 70% improvement from baseline
Criteria for judging Relative measure If incentive payment is based on the performance of health service providers, relative to that
of other providers.
For example,
• If bonuses are paid for to health service providers in a specific performance rank e.g. the
providers above the top quartile of performance.
• And/or
• If fines are levied on health service providers in certain ranks usually the bottom ranks e.g.
the providers below the lower quartile of performance
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Adoption of the HISReF reporting framework would
also be helpful in facilitating effective communication
between people who design or adopt, implement or
evaluate P4P schemes. It would help provide structured
information to P4P designers and developers, so that
they understand the possible results of their design
choices and possibly help guide their thinking.
The typology should aid analysis and interpretation of
the heterogeneous results of the evaluated P4P schemes.
The typology now needs to be further developed by
Table 6 Results of applying the typology to P4P schemes identified from the review by Eijkenaar et al. [59]
P4P schemes Who receives
the incentive
Type of
incentive
Size of incentive Time lag Performance
measured
Domain measured Risk
Advancing quality
(AQ) UK
Groups Bonuses Small Short: 2/3
months lag
Relative Mostly within Physicians control
(2 final outcomes and 26 processes)
High
Clalit
Israel
Groups Bonuses Dependent on
budget savings
Long: Annually Absolute Mostly within Physicians control
(10 processes and 8 intermediate
outcomes)
Low
Clinical Practice
Improvement Pay
(CPIP)
Australia, Queensland
Groups Bonuses Large Short: 3 month lag Absolute Within physicians control
(12 structures and 7 processes)
Low
ERGOV
Germany
Groups Fines Depend on
other hospitals
Short: 4 month lag Relative Not completely within the
physicians control (Final outcome)
High
MACCABI
Israel
Groups Bonuses Size not reported Long: Annually Absolute Mostly within Physicians control
(12 processes and 5 intermediate
outcomes)
Low
National Health
Insurance P4P
(NHI-P4P)
Taiwan
Groups Bonuses Large Short: Monthly Relative 12 structures, 3 final outcomes,
and 2 intermediate outcomes
High
Primary care P4P
(PC-P4P)
Netherlands
Primary Care
Groups Bonuses Large Long: Annually Relative Within physicians control
(31 processes)
High
Renewal Models
(PCRM)
Canada Ontario
Groups Bonuses Small Long: Annually Absolute Within physicians control
(12 processes)
Low
Physician Integrated
Network (PIN)
Canada Manitoba
Groups Bonuses Maximum
payment
unknown
Short: Immediately
after performance
measure
Absolute Within physicians control
(only processes)
Low
Practice Incentive
Program (PIP)
Australia
Groups Bonuses Size not reported
relative to income
Short: Semi-annually
and annually
Absolute Within physicians control
(only structures and processes)
Low
Performance
management
Program (PMP)
New Zealand
Groups Bonuses Small Long: Semi-annually
and annually
Absolute Within physicians control
(8 processes)
Low
Program of quality
Improvement
(PQI) Argentina
Groups Bonuses Large Long: Annually Absolute Mostly within physicians control
(16 processes, 7 structures and
3 outcomes)
Low
Quality and Outcomes
Framework (QOF) UK
Groups Bonuses Large Long: Annually Absolute Mostly within physicians control
(85% processes)
Low
Table 7 Kappa values for each item on the P4P typology
Items on the typology Kappa Z Prob > Z
Item 1(who receives the incentive: individuals or groups) 0.9510 12.40 0.0000
Item 2 (type of incentive: fines or bonuses) 0.9145 11.92 0.0000
Item 3 (size of incentive: small or large) 0.7157 9.33 0.0000
Item 4 (perceived risk of not earning the incentive: low or high) 0.7059 9.20 0.0000
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applying it to the literature. For example, design variables
not included in this typology might be relevant in the near
future and added on in a more extensive typology. Though
adding more design variables to the current typology
might make it a cumbersome framework to be used for
analyses and exploration heterogeneity.
The HiSREF and P4P typology were designed to be
able to describe, categorize, and analyze whole P4P
schemes, however, there are some cases (especially for
very large schemes with multiple indicators) where only
a few indicators are evaluated at once. The P4P typology
is still relevant as it provides a structured way to de-
scribe the design features within which these indicators
sit and are used. Even if only some indicators are evalu-
ated or design features modified, it is important to
understand the whole scheme context as well as the par-
ticularities under consideration.
This reporting framework and derived typology of P4P
design features provides only one set of tools to understand
P4P schemes. Factors over and above design features may
affect the impact of schemes [26, 27, 70–72] such as:
 The context in which the P4P scheme is
implemented (health systems, increased funding,
and complexity)
 How well the program is being piloted: use of
baseline measurement, setting of targets, degree of
preliminary work done
 Rigour of evaluation (absence or presence of control
groups)
 Clinical area of intervention.
Conclusion
This newly developed reporting framework (HISReF)
and the analytic typology derived from it are contribu-
tions to understanding the influence design features has
on the impact of P4P incentive schemes given the num-
ber of schemes being developed across the world. Our
research suggests that the reporting framework and typ-
ology are ready for use and further development by
other researchers, as simple and effective tools to de-
scribe and categorise well reported P4P schemes in
health care. Their adoption will improve the develop-
ment of an interpretable evidence base through more
structured evidence synthesis and interpretation of re-
sults of evaluations of incentive schemes in health care.
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